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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates how the adaptation of the new regulations of Base III will 
affect the banking industry and how the theoretical framework around charter 
value hypothesis can explain these changes. The empirical study has been based on 
performance analysis of four major European banks with the purpose of identifying 
the impact of the new regulations on their finances. The data used for this study is 
from banks’ financial statements and annual reports as well as the European 
Banking Authorities and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The results 
show that the impact of Basel III on the banks considered in this paper varies 
significantly depending on the bank’s business model and activities prior to the 
financial crisis of 2008.  Further, Basel III is considered to create a new environment 
for banking with regards to solvency and liquidity; however it is argued that the 
accord carries limitations in its approach to risk measurements and its ability to act 
as a prevention of excessive risk taking leading to financial instability.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background   
In the last two decades, the increased frequency of banking crises has intensified the 
moral hazard within the banking industry where bank profits are privatized, but 
their losses are nationalized. Inadequate control of moral hazard in banking has led 
to increased risk taking- a behavior which has been central in the recent crisis. The 
practice of restructuring financial instruments, transfer of risk, aggressive 
accounting and misrepresented credit ratings, has led to massive value extraction 
rather than creation. Further this has highlighted the shortcomings of the 
cornerstones of financial stability, namely efficient risk management, corporate 
governance and financial regulation.  
The purpose of risk management is to identify and to evaluate the risks faced by the 
firm and to monitor and manage these risks in an efficient way. The most important 
step towards this is the process of identification and measurement of risks. Models 
based on assumptions such as dynamic trading, continuous liquidity, constant 
correlations and normal market conditions have failed to obtain quantitative risk 
management strategies that minimize risk exposure. Ignoring critical dimensions of 
risk as well as abnormal market conditions, rapid and turbulent changes in the 
economy, limitations and misuse of risk models, are all factors considered to be key 
contributors to poor risk management seen during the crisis.  
 Keeping banks’ risk-taking in check is one of the main aims of banking supervisors, 
an aim that is more emphasized today than ever before. Regulations such as on-site 
examinations, off-site surveillance and capital requirements are a few examples of 
the tools used to supervise the pattern and the degree of risk taken by the banks 
(Demsetz, Saidenberg, Strahan, 1996). The staggering scope of recent crisis, poorly 
functioning banking systems and their highly negative impact on economic growth, 
has given rise to a great need for reforms in bank regulation and supervision. The 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision has provided extensive guidelines and 
  
 
7 
 
supervisory standards for regulation and supervision of banks. The committee’s 
objectives have been to enhance comprehension of key issues concerning the 
banking system and to provide a forum on banking supervisory matters. 1 It has 
aimed to ensure the stability of the financial system by creating a sound banking 
environment. The magnitude of the current financial crisis reflects the failure of this 
attempt. To fully understand the basis on which the regulatory system is considered 
to have failed, it is of equivalent significance to understand the environment of the 
banking industry and the changes it has undergone.  
A central development in industrialized countries during the past decades has been 
deregulation and integration of the financial markets, a development that has 
created a more competitive market. As competition among suppliers of financial 
services has given rise to more efficiency in the allocation of financial resources, it 
has removed constrains on bank risk-taking by eliminating many geographic and 
investment restrictions (Saunders and Wilson, 2001) The concerns have also been 
due to the consequences increased competition has had on banks’ charter value, 
which has been identified to be a key determinant of risk-taking of banks (Weisbrod, 
Lee and Rojas-Suarez, 1992)  
1.2 Objective of the Study  
In this paper, it is sought to understand the effect that Basel III regulations will have 
on the banking industry by understanding how the accord is meant to affect bank 
performance as well as financial stability. To evaluate this, I use the theoretical 
framework of charter value hypothesis to describe the key determinants of risk 
taking in banking. 
1.3 Question at hand 
 What changes are to be expected in the banking industry given an 
implementation of the new Basel III regulations, and how can these be 
explained by charter value hypothesis?  
                                                          
1
 For more information see: The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision  
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1.4 Limitations 
The main limitations in this study refer to not enough data being available for 
examination of direct effects on the industry given Basel III regulations, due to the 
accord being fairly new and not fully implemented. The implications are therefore 
considered not to be entirely evident as of yet, however changes that are seen 
during the last few years as a result of an adaptation of the new rules, give fair 
indications.  Further limitation exists with regards to the degree of isolation these 
implications can be considered to, as the industry is characterized by high 
complexity and interconnectedness to other aspects of the global economy.  
1.5 Methodology 
The methodology chosen is a combination of theoretical and empirical research, 
where theory on charter value hypothesis and bank risk behavior has been applied 
to the problem at hand, with an intention of understanding the underlying factors of 
financial stability and how the Basel regulations are meant to achieve this. Further, I 
have examined how the profitability, liquidity and capital adequacy of four of the 
largest European banks have been affected by both crisis of 2008 and the pre-
adaptation of the Basel III regulations. This is mainly done with focus on their 
balance sheets, profit & loss statements and key performance ratios.  
1.6 Disposition 
The paper is divided in five parts. The second part, following introduction, will 
address the theoretical context around charter value, bank risk taking and 
regulations based on literature and previous research. The requirements and 
characteristics of the Basel III agreement will be described here, providing an 
overview of the developments since the introduction of Basel II. Part three consists 
of the empirical study, based on performance analysis of four European banks. This 
is followed by the discussion and further the paper is finalized by conclusion. 
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2. Theory 
2.1  Definition of Charter Value  
Guttentag and Herring (1983) define charter value as follows: 
-“the present value of the net income the bank would be expected to earn on new 
business if it were to retain only its office, employees and customers. (…). [It] depends 
on the bank’s authorized powers, including power to do business within specified 
areas, the market structure in the area, the expertise of the bank’s employees, and the 
customer relationships it has developed”. 
One of the most important policies decided by regulators is to determine at which 
economic state a bank is to be closed. There are different models that have been 
introduced and used for this purpose. An example of these is the Acharya-Dreyfus 
(1989) model which states that a bank should be closed when its asset-to-deposits 
ratio is below a threshold which is slightly greater than 1. However, in reality banks 
have great advantages and benefit from economies of scale, reputation, monopoly 
rents as well as superior information in the financial markets. These are benefits 
that are foregone when the bank is closed, and are referred to as the banks charter 
value (Sankarshan, 1996, p. 352). This refers to charter value as the present value of 
the net income the bank would be expected to earn on new business if it were to 
retain its mentioned benefits. Further the bank charter value is defined as the value 
that would be foregone in the event of bankruptcy or closure and therefore 
represents the bank’s private cost of failure (Saibal, 2009). In a highly competitive 
market most firms are not always able to generate stable profits as the existing 
competition on the market forces them to lower their prices to levels just high 
enough to cover all costs. However, the superior advantages such as those 
mentioned above may have charter value (Demsetz, Saidenberg, Strahan, 1996). 
The charter value arises from mainly two sources, namely the market-related and 
the bank-related sources. The market-related source involves regulatory 
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restrictions on entry and competition, including banks’ exclusive access to protected 
markets as the charter value is largely dependent on the level of competition, which 
in turn is dependent on entry costs and required capital levels. Despite exposure to 
the same competition and regulations, difference in charter value can be expected. 
This is induced by the bank-related source including factors such as customer 
relationship, the reputation the bank has acquired as well as the efficiency 
advantages a bank may have in terms of competence and information they possess.   
2.2 Measuring charter value 
In financial literature, charter value is measured as the net present value of future 
rents. Keeley (1990) defines charter value as the ratio of the market value to the 
book value of assets, also referred to as Tobin’s Q.  
𝑄𝑖(𝑡) =  
𝐸𝑀
𝑖 (𝑡) +  𝐿𝐵
𝑖 (𝑡)
𝐴𝐵
𝑖 (𝑡)
 
where 𝐸𝑀
𝑖 (𝑡) is the market value of equity, 𝐿𝐵
𝑖 (𝑡) is the book value of liabilities and 
𝐴𝐵
𝑖 (𝑡) is the book value of assets, all measures at year t (Nicolo, 2000, p. 10). The 
ratio represents the market value of a bank to the replacement cost of its assets. The 
market value of assets is defined as the sum of the market value of equity and the 
book value of liabilities. The replacement of cost of the assets is defined as the book 
value of assets. This is a common proxy for charter value and is used in many 
studies due to the measure containing relevant information about the value that 
would be forgone in case of a closure. Nicolo (2000) argues that Tobin’s Q is an 
appropriate measure of charter value as it includes the discounted value of rents 
due to market power, competitive advantages as well as rents due any safety net 
subsidy. 
2.3 Determinants of Charter Value 
In banking, the charter value arises from two main sources. Regulatory restrictions 
on entry to markets and competition are considered to be the “market-related” 
sources.  By executing regulations that restricted entry opportunities and limited 
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competition in the sector, a privileged market was provided for the banks to operate 
in and they were given access to profits through monopoly rents. Before 1970s, U.S. 
banks were prohibited from operating across states as they faced limits on 
geographic expansion both within states and across the states. The restrictions on 
expansion and intrastate branching resulted in higher market power for the 
surviving banks and provided them with the opportunity to build charter value 
(Demsetz, Saidenberg, Strahan, 1996).  Hence, entry in the banking sector and the 
right to operate on that market are subject to obtaining a charter. Although the 
regulatory and technological changes have been a central determinant of banks’ 
charter value, the so called “bank-related” sources remain important.  Even though 
banks are faced with the same beneficial effects of market protection against 
competition and expansion, their charter value can vary. This is induced by the 
bank-related or bank-specific factors such as having a competitive advantage in 
dealing with customers, who prefer the convenience of full-service banking at a local 
branch. The bank-related advantages are also advantages such as efficiency in 
management that provides the bank to grow at the expense of their poorly managed 
rivals (Demsetz, Saidenberg, Strahan, 1996). Marketing advantages in selling 
financial products such as mutual funds and life insurances as well as a bank’s 
unique relationship with many of their borrowers are other examples of bank-
related factors that create charter value. Banks’ long term relationships also allows 
them to gain superior information on the creditworthiness and credit risks of the 
borrowers which leads to a reduction of the bank’s costs, making lending activities 
more profitable. These relationships in combination with the bank’s reputation, 
which generates a favorable business framework, are of great importance for 
creating charter value (Fisher and Gueyie, 2001, p. 4). 
2.4 Charter Value Hypothesis 
Charter value has been known to have a self-imposed disciplinary effect on a bank’s 
risk taking. This relationship has been evaluated by many during the past decades, 
amongst others by Keeley (1990), who argues that banks with high charter value 
tend to maintain a more prudent risk-strategy by holding more capital relative to 
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assets. They tend to avoid excessive risk which could jeopardize their stream of 
future cash flows. The self-regulating incentive for banks to constrain risk taking, 
which is provided by valuable bank charter, is a hypothesis termed the charter-value 
hypothesis (CVH). According to the CVH, regulations that lead to a higher value of 
bank charter through entry restrictions and enhanced profit opportunities increase 
the incentive for prudent behavior in taking risk. In contrast, it also highlights how 
deregulatory efforts that increase competition on the financial market, can have a 
negative effect on charter value and therefore induce higher level of risk taking by 
the banks (Saunders and Wilson, 2001). 
An example that can help to clarify the grounds for the CVH, is considering a small 
bank which has little capital or no charter value. Given CVH, the bank is more likely 
to give high-risk loans to, for instance, high-tech startups, knowing that if and when 
the loans are repaid the bank will make high profits. However if the loans default, 
the bank has lost little by not having a large value of charter. Assuming that the 
loans are repaid and profits are gained, as well as having established a valuable and 
long term lending relationship with the high-tech start-up, the firm becomes 
profitable and builds a high charter value, since it can expect strong future profits. 
With charter to lose, the owners of the bank will be less aggressive in lending 
strategies in the future, and will have the incentive as well as the ability to raise the 
bank’s capital-to asset ratio, and further decrease the likelihood of insolvency. While 
both regulations on minimum bank capital levels and a high charter value can 
discourage risk taking, the charter value is considered to be more stable as it is 
related to operating efficiency and lending relationships, and thereby not as 
sensitive to changes in the general economic conditions as the capital position of a 
bank could be (Saunders and Wilson, 2001, p. 185).  
2.5 Charter Value’s Effect on Risk Taking  
The general theory behind the charter value and its effect on bank behavior is that 
banks that have succeeded in creating charter value will seek to preserve it.  As the 
charter value of banks declines due to deregulations and increased competition, 
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banks may be induced to take risks. An increasing number of empirical studies have 
been examining the relationship between charter value and risk, confirming the 
disciplining effect of charter value on banks’ risk-taking. A study by Keeley (1990) 
documents the decline in charter value of U.S. banks during the 1950s through 
1960s and 1970s as the banking industry experienced deregulations and thereby an 
increase of competition from new banks as well as nonbank financial institutions. 
He argues that the decline in bank charter value during this period explains the risk 
taking behavior of banks during the 1980s. The article finds that the average charter 
value ratio among a panel of large bank holding companies fell sharply in the 1970s 
and made only partial recovery during the mid-1980s. He argues that the drop in 
banks’ charter value may have reduced bank’s incentive to act prudently and is the 
underlying factor of the increased risk-taking by U.S. banks during this period,  
leading to a concerning high rate of bank failure (Keeley, 1990). 
 
Figure 1:  The figure plots the mean value of Tobin’s Q and the equity to asset ratio at all US publically traded banking holding 
companies between 1988 and 2008. 
Source: Journal of Economics and Business, Volume 63, Issue 5, 2011, 372-391  
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Demsetz et al. (1996) explores the relationship between the charter value and risk 
by extending Keeley’s empirical analysis by estimating the effect of charter value on 
different measures of bank risk. The study confirms an inverse relationship between 
the two and finds that banks with a higher charter value hold more capital and 
thereby have less asset risk then banks with low levels of charter value. Banks with 
high charter value are shown to maintain better diversified loan portfolios although 
holding the same rate of risky loans as other banks. The empirical results suggest 
that less competitive markets and valuable lending relationships are of importance 
for more efficient and safe banking (Demsetz, Saidenberg, Strahan, 1996). Extensive 
literature has provided evidence for deposit insurance and charter value being the 
two main determinants of bank risk-taking incentives. Gonzales (2005) analyzes the 
impact of bank regulations on bank charter value and risk-taking, taking into 
account the deposit insurance available in the 36 different countries. The paper 
provides empirical evidence for the effect regulatory restrictions have on bank risk-
taking through their influence on charter value (Gonzales, 2005, p. 1154) 
The dramatic changes in charter values has provided the opportunity to identify the 
factors that affect bank charter and how these factors are related to shifts in the 
banking environment. Furlong and Kwan (2006) identify these shifts in the banking 
environment as four fundamental changes that the banking industry has undergone, 
all with potential to impact charter value. Restructuring of banks and bank activities 
due to the geographic expansion is considered to be one of the four major changes 
observed in the banking environment with a notable impact on banks’ charter value. 
The mid-1980s, all the way into the 1990’s, represent an important period for these 
changes. The large degree of mergers and consolidations in the banking industry 
during this period is a main aspect of this matter, leading to an increase in 
concentration in banking at a national level (Laderman, 2005). The growth of 
activities associated with non-interest revenue, such as securities trading, loan 
guarantees and services, brokerage services etc. is marked out to be another 
important factor. Both larger banking organizations as well as medium and smaller 
banking organizations have had a growth in reliance on fee income rather than 
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interest income. In a study on the determinants of charter value and its disciplining 
effects on risk taking of banks, Furlong and Kwan (2006) show that non-interest 
revenue had a positive and significant effect on charter value. Improved operating 
efficiency in areas such as risk management and processing of information as a 
result of adoption of new technologies is considered to be the third fundamental 
change that the banking environment has undergone. Being an information-based 
industry, the advancement in information technology (IT) has allowed banks to not 
only reduce costs of providing traditional banking services, but also to facilitate 
innovations in financial products and has enabled expansion into new financial 
services activities. These developments and improvements in operation efficiency 
captured by banks have led to a rise in their charter values. Supervisory and 
regulatory changes aiming to reduce bank risk taking and introduction of federal 
safety nets and deposit insurances is the fourth development that has occurred in 
the banking industry, leading to changes in how charter is created (Furlong and 
Kwan, 2005). 
2.6 Deposit Insurance 
Among industrial countries, policies that either explicitly or implicitly protect bank 
customers, and in turn the banks themselves from failure, are frequently adopted.  
This is done through different type of insurance systems, which is argued to result 
in the banks taking excessive risk (Weisbrod, Lee and Rojas-Suarez, 1992, p. 6). 
Federal deposit insurance was one of the most important reforms of the banking 
system, introduced in the 1930s in the United States, as a response to the dramatic 
increase in bank failures during the Great Depression. It aimed to protect depositors 
against loss and thereby to restore the lost confidence in the financial system and to 
avoid crisis such of that during 1930s (Grossman, 1992, p. 801). Today, deposit 
insurance is one of the most criticized government policies related to bank failures, 
as it is considered among some economists to incentivize excessive risk taking by 
banks. When deposit insurance legislation was introduced during the 1930s, the 
coverage was capped, regulations were imposed to limit risk taking and deposit 
interest rate ceilings were in place to prevent destructive competition amongst 
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banks. The rationale for deposit interest ceilings was to prohibit banks from 
competing for deposits through interest rates, limiting what banks could pay to 
their depositors, lowering the yield needed, and thereby the risk they would have to 
carry, to be competitive.  
Merton (1977) and Kraeken and Wallace (1978) showed that because depositors 
are insured and thereby protected against failure to the extent of insurance 
coverage, they are more willing to accept lower rate of return on their deposits, 
lowering the cost of deposits and resulting in banks to a larger extent financing their 
activities with deposits rather than equity or non-deposit liabilities. The elimination 
of deposit rate ceilings in the United States in 1980s, in combination with an 
increase of the deposit insurance coverage, led to increased competition, lower 
charter value and further to moral hazard. The problem originates in insured 
depositors lacking the incentive to monitor and to ask for compensation for risk 
taking. This is why regulatory framework is vital with regards to deposit insurance 
and to monitor the extent to which banks fund their high risk activities with 
deposits.  In the absence of deposit rate ceilings, the bank will, without meeting any 
additional costs, maximize the risk of its loan portfolio to maximize returns and 
attract depositors. The theory behind deposit insurance affecting bank risk taking 
and being a source of moral hazard is strongly linked with financial liberalization. 
Among economists it is commonly believed that deposit insurance is optimal in its 
role as a policy to prevent bank runs only when effective regulatory framework and 
bank supervision exists. Empirical studies on this subject suggest that where bank 
interest rates are deregulated and institutional environments are weak, 
opportunities for moral hazard exist given deposit insurance is available (Demirguc-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2001). This is not to say that excessive risk taking strategies 
are preferred by the equity holders or even intentionally perused by the bank due to 
existence of deposit insurance per se, but in the light of requirements of high return 
on equity, it is argued that it has an effect on the risk behavior of the bank, as it can 
fund high-risk/high-return activities with deposits rather than with equity. 
However, the presence of high charter value is argued to mitigate moral hazard in 
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this context by creating alignment between the depositors’ and the equity holders’ 
incentives as view on risk and reward changes when the cost of failure is high 
(Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993). 
Milne and Whalley (1998) showed that charter value interpreted as the present 
value of current and future profits depends on the number of banks allowed in the 
system, which in turn depend on entry costs and required capital levels. This, in 
accordance with previous studies mentioned, highlights the importance of 
competition in a discussion of bank risk taking.  
2.7 Competition and Bank Risk Taking 
Like other sectors of the economy, in the banking sector attention must be given to 
the interaction between competition and financial stability. A common assumption 
in the academic literature is that charter value plays a central role in limiting bank 
risk taking. As the underlying sources of charter value are entry opportunities, 
competition and market power, enforced deregulations and increased competition 
has been considered to have a negative effect on banking stability through its effect 
on bank charter value. It is considered that more bank competition lowers market 
power and profit margins, leaving banks with the incentive to invest in high risk 
assets yielding high private returns for the bank. It is therefore of interest to discuss 
the relationship between competition and financial stability and further the effect 
competition can have on bank risk taking.   
Since the 1970s, the banking sector has undergone great changes, going from a 
regulated environment to a wide deregulation during the 1980s, which has led to 
significantly increased competition within the banking industry.2 Competition as a 
result of deregulations and liberalization of the banking system has shown to lower 
bank charter value and encourage riskier activities such as lowering capital levels, 
taking on more credit risk in the loan portfolio, or both in an attempt to make 
profits. This is especially true for banks with low or no charter value, operating in a 
                                                          
2
 See Edwards and Mishkin (1995) for a more complete discussion of the changes in banking since the mid-
1970s. 
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highly competitive market. Keeley (1990) found that increased competition, 
relaxation of regulatory restrictions in United States during 1970s and 1980s, led to 
reduction in monopoly rents and eroded charter value as a consequence. This, he 
argues, was the main contributing factor behind the bank failures in United States 
during this period. Investigating the underlying elements of the East Asian financial 
crisis during 1997, Radelet and Sachs (1998) explain how the main countries 
affected, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, were all characterized with 
limited competition on the banking sector as foreign banks were unable to enter the 
financial market due to  protectionism of domestic banks. These barriers were 
reduced as a result of financial market liberalization, leading to increased 
competition on the market with foreign banks being allowed entry. Reduced 
restrictions had a negative effect on profitability and on the charter value of 
domestic banks, resulting in higher bank risk taking. Simultaneously, lack of 
regulatory oversight and prudential instruments, such as higher capital 
requirements etc., further allowed for excessive risk taking and gambling by banks 
(Radelet and Sachs, 1998). 
Suarèz (1994) showed that as the market power of a bank decreases, there is a 
significant increase in incentive to engage in riskier activities. As the charter value is 
connected with the bankruptcy costs of a firm, it can induce prudent policies, which 
increases the bank’s solvency. In a study made on bank regulation and its effect on 
risk taking, Agoraki et al. (2011) found that banks with high market power carry a 
lower probability of default as well as reduced credit risk. Chan et al. (1986) 
underlines how the surplus made by banks on high-quality borrowers is capped in 
high competitive markets. This leads to banks doing less screening for high quality 
borrowers due to fierce competition, resulting in a negative effect on asset quality. 
Demsetz et al. (1996) shows a strong relationship between market power and high 
capital ratio and low asset risk. Salas et al. (2003) provides empirical evidence of 
liberalization, defined as increased number of competitors on the financial market, 
had the highest impact on market power and economic profit of Spanish banks. The 
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study concludes that banks with eroded charter values have lower solvency and 
experience more credit risk. 
A more regulated banking system, resulting in restrained competition, is considered 
to encourage banks to protect their charter values by pursuing less risky strategies 
which in turn would ensure the stability of the whole banking system. However, the 
theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on this topic are somewhat mixed 
with regards to the relationship between competition and financial stability, 
creating conflicting predictions. In a paper by Allen and Gale (2004), it is argued that 
the relationship between competition and financial stability is more complex than 
the widely-held belief of the “trade-off“ between the two. The study implies that 
even though costs related to financial instability are high, it is not necessary to 
reduce competition to avoid these costs as the high efficiency gain from increased 
competition is consistent with the efficiency costs from concentration. It is further 
explained that as financial instability in forms of crisis occur every decade or so, the 
inefficiency costs are born continuously (Allen and Gale, 2004, p. 455). The study 
concludes that the relationship is very case dependent and that different models can 
provide different results depending on countries and periods considered.  
In a study made by Nicolò and Al Jalal (2005), the trade-off between competition 
and banking stability is examined by studying two different models of a banking 
firm. The authors use one model embedding the charter value hypothesis, where 
competition is allowed in deposit markets, but not in loan markets and another 
model, where competition is allowed both in deposit and loan markets. In both 
models banks are allowed to both invest in a risky asset and a risk-free government 
bond, creating a new theoretical environment where new predictions are produced, 
which otherwise would be invisible unless both loan and bond markets are present 
simultaneously. As highlighted in the study, the banking industry’s portfolio choice, 
reflecting the quantity of loans, bonds and deposits, will depend on the degree of 
competition (Nicolò and Al Jalal, 2005).  The charter value hypothesis model in this 
study suggests a positive relationship confirming the trade-off between competition 
and stability. Further, this implies that the charter value hypothesis model predicts 
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higher risk of bank failure as competition increases. However, the second model 
suggests no such trade-off, as it implies a negative relationship between competition 
and stability. This view implies that in markets with limited competition, banks gain 
stronger market positions and can thereby increase rates charged on business loans. 
This in turn increases the credit risk with the borrowers as the cost associated with 
borrowing increases. This movement in credit risk is further argued to increase the 
likelihood for borrowers to default, causing problems for the bank itself and 
therefore lead to more instability. The authors mean that this specific effect can 
eliminate the trade-off between competition and financial stability imposed by the 
charter value hypothesis. With regards to asset allocation, the study shows that the 
equilibrium loan-to-asset ratio will be increasing as the competition increases, a 
prediction which both models make (Nicolò and Al Jalal, 2005). In a paper by 
Martínez-Miera and Repullo (2010), the authors present that the relationship 
between financial stability and competition to be U-shaped, meaning as the number 
of banks increases, the probability of bank default first declines, but increase 
beyond a certain point, suggesting there being an optimal level of competition for 
efficiency versus financial stability. 
2.8 Capital Requirement and Charter Value 
One of the main elements by which regulations such as the Basel accords are meant 
to offset risk-increasing incentives, is by setting minimum requirements for bank 
capital. Generally it is of common practice to hold capital in excess of the required 
minimum as an insurance against risk. However, it is of interest to assess the bank 
capital decisions with regards to moral hazard and bank charter value. In a study by 
Jokipii (2009), the relationship between charter value and excess capital is 
examined. The study shows that banks with valuable charter will maintain excess 
capital buffer to protect themselves against negative shocks as the cost of failure is 
too high. Further, as charter value is below a certain threshold, banks have little or 
no incentive to hold adequate capital, leading to moral hazard. When capital is 
depleted and charter value is low, gambling for resurrection in form of excessive 
risk taking is observed. In a case of positive outcome of the gamble, high returns are 
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made; on the other hand in a negative outcome a bail out by deposit insurance is 
guaranteed. Hence, the study concludes that high charter value has a disciplinary 
effect on capital management and risk taking; however it also shows that the 
existence of deposit insurance creates additional incentive to carry risk. The study 
also shows that even though the relationship between charter value and buffer 
capital is positive, banks with charter values above certain threshold do not 
necessarily hold more capital, but rather maintain a constant level of buffer capital. 
This finding supports the paradigm of “too-big-to-fail”, where large banks with high 
levels of charter beyond a certain point, consider themselves partially insulated 
from failure (Jokipii, 2009). 
2.9  Basel I, II, III  
As banks were becoming more active on the international market, and finical crisis 
showed to no longer being confided to one country3, there was a necessity for an 
international regime to protect global financial systems and their depositors and to 
create a level of playing field. In response to this, the central governors of the G10 
countries established a Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practices at the end of 1974. Since then the Committee has expanded both its 
membership and jurisdiction. 
Basel I was an international accord issued in 1988 by the Basel Committee on Bank 
Supervision, designed to minimize credit risk and to ensure that lenders were 
sufficiently well capitalized by introducing a minimum level of capital requirements. 
The level of capital requirement was determined with regards to classification of the 
banks’ assets. All assets on a bank’s balance sheet were given weights from 0%, 
representing the safest assets such as government bonds, to 100%, representing the 
most risky assets held by the bank. All internationally operated banks were required 
to maintain a minimum of 8% capital of which 4% was to be Tier 1 capital, i.e. the 
purest form of capital primarily consisting of common stocks, preferred stocks or 
disclosed reserves.  
                                                          
3
 The collapse of the Franklin National Bank of New York (USA) and Herstatt Bank (Germany) in 1974, are 
examples of how consequences of financial crisis started to spill over country borders.  
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As banks became more sophisticated in their operations during the 1990s, they 
found ways to reduce risk weighted assets (RWA) without actually reducing real 
risk. This development, in combination with the Basel I‘s lack of differentiation of 
risks, created a divergence between Basel I risk weights and actual risk exposure. It 
was therefore decide to introduce a new capital standard, namely Basel II, aiming to 
better align and integrate capital requirement regulation with efficient risk 
management practices and to eliminate regulatory arbitrage. It put much more 
emphasis on the bank’s internal methodologies and provided more flexibility. Basel 
II consists of three complementary pillars. Pillar I is on regulatory calculations of 
capital requirements for not only credit risk (as Basel I covered) but also market 
and operational risk. Pillar II is the supervisory review process, where both the 
bank’s total capital adequacy given its risk portfolio, as well as the bank’s 
management of capital are assessed. This section goes beyond the mechanistic 
calculation of minimum capital, but attempts to create an understanding and 
assessment of the bank’s risk profile and to establish a strong risk management 
culture within the bank. It allows lenders to model and assess their own capital 
requirement levels using the Internal Rating Based (IRB)4 approach and further to 
create internal processes and strategies for maintaining their capital. It also focused 
on market risk, an area which was previously unregulated by Basel I. Supervisors 
should review and evaluate the bank’s internal assessment together with their 
ability to monitor risk, and further take appropriate measures if the bank’s results 
are not satisfactory. Pillar III is on market discipline. In order to maintain 
transparency for counterparties and investors, banks are required to provide 
detailed information on their activities, risk profile and their risk management.  
Recent global economic crisis and financial instability highlighted the shortcomings 
of Basel II and has created a further need for a restructured approach to risk and 
regulation in banking, giving rise to the Basel III accord. Basel III is an agreement 
meant to promote a more resilient banking sector through stronger capital and 
                                                          
4
 The IBR approach requires banks to specify the probability of default for each individual credit, assess 
the loss associated with default, and the expected exposure at default. The methodology requires highly 
complex modelling and aggregation. 
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liquidity rules. It is, compared to its predecessors, identified by an enhanced level of 
complexity. The philosophy behind the new accord is to maintain the spirit of Basel 
II with regards to capital requirements, and to further ensure that financial 
institutions operate at lower risk levels and possess higher levels of equity to 
account for potential losses.5 The new regulatory framework is to be implemented 
gradually to allow banks to comply with the new requirements and to contain the 
real impact on the economy.  The Basel 3 framework has been translated into law by 
means of two separate legislative instruments, namely a Directive (CRD 4) and a 
Regulation (CRR), which will be directly binding and applicable within each 
European Union Member State. The first proposal of the new regulation was 
introduced in July 2011. Following EU Parliament approval, the CRD 4 was formally 
published in July  2013 and applies from January 1, 2014.  Implementation of parts 
of the accord will be phased all the way to 2019.  
Basel III requires banks to hold a Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (CET 1) of 
4.5%, in contrast to the previous 2% under Basel II. Further this includes 
contractual terms that allows write off or conversion to common shares, in case the 
bank is judged to be non-viable. This is meant as a contribution of the private sector 
to resolve any future banking crisis and to reduce moral hazard behaviour. Further 
there is a capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5%, resulting in total 
common equity requirement to 7%. There is also an element of countercyclical 
buffer within a range of 0-2.5% comprising common equity, imposed when 
authorities recognize an unacceptable build-up of systematic risk due to credit 
growth. The minimum Tier 1 Capital ratio requirement has increased from 4.5% to 
6% from 2015 onwards. Minimum Total Capital requirement is held at 8%, 
excluding the conservation buffer of 2.5%- resulting in a total of 10.5% to be met in 
2019. The capital instruments that no longer qualify as non-core Tier 1 or Tier 2 
capital are phased out over a 10 year period beginning 2013. Basel III also includes 
requirements on more rigorous credit analysis of externally rated securitisation 
exposure. It takes into account counterparty credit risk, by including more stringent 
                                                          
5
 For more information: http://www.bis.org 
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requirements for measuring exposure, as well as higher capital for inter-financial 
sector exposure. The accord includes minimum requirement on liquidity coverage 
ratio of 100% by 2019, together with a net stable funding ratio, which is yet to be 
defined. The liquidity coverage ratio requires banks to have sufficient quality assets 
to withstand a 30-day stressed funding scenario defined by the Basel Committee. 
The net stable funding ratio is a structural ratio, meant to provide incentives for 
sound funding sources. 6 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, Basel III, A Global Regulatory Framework for More Recilient 
Banks and Banking Systems, Revised Version June 2011 
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3. Empirical Study 
Performance analysis of banks has become of increased importance for both 
internal as well as external parties, such as the shareholders, depositors, regulators, 
credit rating companies, the market and its participants. It is of outmost relevance to 
measure the efficiency and profitability of a bank’s operations, both due to key 
stakeholders’ interest, but also because of the central role banks play in world 
economy and for financial stability, and last but not least for assessment of 
regulatory impact. Financial statements and key ratios are a common tool for 
evaluating the financial performance of banks with regards to profitability, liquidity, 
asset quality and credit performance.  
In order to depict the impact of the crisis and the pre-adaptation of the Basel III 
requirements, I have selected four European banks to study over the immediate five 
year period following the crisis of 2008. These four banks are four of the largest 
European banks, each with roots in one of the top four economies in Europe by GDP 
size.  Further they all have international presence with investment banking as part 
of their business.  
 Bank  Country Total Assets (YE 2013) 
Deutsche Bank Germany €1,611 bn 
BNP Paribas France €1,800 bn 
Royal bank of Scotland UK €1,229 bn 
UniCredit Italy €846 bn 
Table 1: Banks included in this study. Source for data presented: Bank Annual Reports 
Below, the Tobin’s Q, measuring bank charter value, is presented for each of the 
above mentioned banks.   
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Figure 2: Tobin’s Q calculated for each bank as per YE data. Source: data used for calculations are from bank 
Annual Reports 
 
3.1 Profitability 
Profitability ratios are meant to evaluate a firm’s ability to generate earnings. They 
are of vital concern to stockholders and are broadly used as a performance measure. 
The most common measures on bank profitability are the following:  
Return on Assets (ROA) = Net Profit / Total Assets 
Return on Equity (ROE) = Net Profit / Total Equity 
Return on Deposits (ROD) = Net Profit / Total Deposits 
The (ROA) is a well-established metric, indicating how much net income is 
generated per $ of assets, i.e. measuring how efficiently banks use their assets for 
generating profits. (ROE) is another important measure of a bank’s performance, as 
it is an indicator of not only profitability, but also growth potential. Given profits are 
not paid out as dividend but are retained within the company, and given that ROE 
levels are maintained, a company’s maximum growth rate is the same as its ROE 
ratio, without any additional loans. This is a central ratio for shareholders and for 
valuation of banks, as traditional cash flow models are more difficult to construct for 
financial institutions. (ROD) is a popular measure for financial analysts as it reflects 
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the bank’s ability to utilize the customer’s deposits for generation profits. Further, 
each bank’s earnings per share development (EPS) is shown throughout the period.  
 
Figure 3: Return on Assets. Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
  
 
Figure 4: Return on Equity. Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
 
 
Figure 5: Return on Deposits. Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
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Figure 6: Earnings per Share. Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
 
 
3.2 Liquidity 
Liquidity ratios for a bank demonstrate the bank’s ability to meet its short-term 
financial obligations in an effective manner and provide an indication of how large 
margin of safety it possesses. The below are the liquidity ratios used in this study. 
Total Loans to Total Assets (LtA) = Total Loans / Total Assets 
Total Loans to Total Deposits (LtD) = Total Loans / Total Deposits  
Liquid Assets to Customer Deposits (LAtD) = Total Liquid Assets / Customer 
Deposist  
(LtA) measures the portion of the assets being tied up in loans; the higher this ratio, 
the less liquid is the bank. (LtD) is commonly used for assessing liquidity and credit 
risk. The ratio is an indicator of how large portion of the bank’s loans are funded 
through deposits. This ratio can be an indication of several factors; however in the 
context of liquidity, a too high (LtD) ratio represents low liquidity and vulnerability 
to any sudden changes in its deposit base. Conversely if the ratio is too low, it’s an 
indication of the bank keeping too much unproductive capital. (LAtD) represents the 
percentage of short term financial obligations that can be met with the bank’s liquid 
assets, here defined as cash. This is an important ratio for measuring how well a 
bank can absorb an economic shock and its ability to meet sudden withdrawals.  
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Earnings per Share (EPS) 
UniCredit Deutsche Bank BNP Paribas Royal Bank of Scotland
  
 
29 
 
 
Figure 7: Net Loans to Total Asset.  Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
 
 
Figure 8: Net Loans to Total Deposits.  Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
 
 
Figure 9: Total Liquid Assets to Customer Deposits.  Source: Calculations based on data from bank annual reports 
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3.3 Efficiency  
The efficiency ratio measures how efficient the bank is in utilizing overhead 
expenses in generating profits. Together with the operating margin, they provide a 
good indication of productivity. A low ratio is desirable as it means lower overhead 
expenses in relation to the bank’s income, indicating higher efficiency. The efficiency 
ratio in short term also provides a good insight to if the management has a more 
strict focus on maximizing profitability (a lower ratio) or if the focus is more on 
utility (a higher ratio), in terms of larger staff, presence in more locations etc.  
Efficiency Ratio (Cost/Income Ratio)= Non-Interest Expenses / Operating revenue 
3.4 Capital Adequacy & Risk Exposure 
In the framework of the Basel III regulations, the highest quality of capital is known 
as Common Equity Tier I (CET1).  This category includes common shares issued by 
the bank that meet the requirements of the classification made for regulatory 
purposes, stock surplus, retained earnings etc. 7 The CET 1 ratio is a measurement of 
the bank’s core capital relative to its risk-weighted assets, and is the primary 
measurement of the bank’s capital strength as per Basel III definition and 
requirement. The CET 1 ratio must be a minimum of 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at 
all times and should be available to absorb losses without the bank being obliged to 
cease trading. The Basel III regulations require further Additional Tier 1 capital and 
Tier 2 capital such as instruments issued by the bank that are neither secured nor 
covered by a guarantee of the issuer as well as stock surplus resulting from the issue 
of the mentioned instruments. This category of capital offers a lower level of 
protection for depositors and other creditors. It only comes into play after the CET 1 
capital has been lost. The assets on the bank’s balance sheet are assessed with 
regards to risk exposure and degree of risk. Items such as cash and short term loans 
to governments are considered to have 0 percentage risk weighting.  Claims on 
                                                          
7
 For more detailed information on the specific elements of Common Equity Tier 1 Capital, please see 
Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient banks and Banking Systems 
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banks and public sector have a risk weight of 20 percent, residential mortgages a 
risk weight of 50 percent and other credit exposure set at 100 percent. The aim of 
the risk weighting process is an attempt to capture the riskiness of various types of 
exposures that banks have with regards to both on- as well as off-balance sheet 
activities.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Deutsche bank 
With regards to profitability, Deutsche Bank shows somewhat more stable 
performance, although with declining trends. The ROA ratio has decreased from 
0.3% in 2009 to 0% by end 2013, showing a decline of efficiency in using assets to 
generate profits. The decline would have been greater had the bank not increased 
its assets throughout the period of 2009-2012. The ROE confirms the downward 
profitability trend, going from 14% in 2009 to 1% in 2013, due to overall decreased 
profits in combination with the equity increasing with regards to capital 
strengthening attempts. In 2013, the bank decided to execute a capital increase by 
issuing 90 million new shares. Due to the issuance of new shares, de-risking 
activities and increased net income, the bank’s Common Tier 1 capital ratio 
improved substantially to 12.8%. The Common Equity Tier 1 ratio increased 7.8% to 
9.7%, fully fulfilling Basel III requirements. In order to reinforce its funding base 
and to reduce funding cost, the bank has concentrated its core funding in the most 
stable sources, such as retail and transaction banking deposits, capital markets 
issuance and equity, representing 66% of the bank’s funding in total. The rationale 
behind this is to lower volatility by focusing on classic banking rather than capital 
intensive assets in investment banking. Deutsche Bank has also accelerated de-
risking of their portfolio, by limiting their sovereign and corporate bond exposures 
in European countries strongly affected by the financial crisis.  The risk weighted 
assets have been lowered from € 106 billion in 2012 to € 58 billion by end 2013. 
The EPS value has been decreasing since 2009, going from € 7.2 to € 0.3 in 2012, 
landing on € 0.7 by end 2013, confirming the downward profitability trend. The C/I 
ratio has increased from 72% in 2009 to 89% in 2013, reflecting the decline in 
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profits relative to the costs of generating profits. As for the liquidity, Deutsche Bank 
has the lowest LtA ratio, averaging around 25%, as well as the lowest LtD ratio, 
averaging around 87%. Both measure indicate relatively high liquidity, which 
enables the bank to meet its financial obligations in due time, one of the main 
objectives of the Basel III accord. However, in terms of pure liquid assets defined in 
this study as cash, the bank scores low on its (LAtD) ratio. This needs to be 
considered in the light of Deutsche bank having easy access to capital markets and a 
strong governmental economy. 
3.5.2 UniCredit 
UniCredit is Italy’s largest bank, and one of the most badly hit banks by the financial 
crisis. Large write-downs of loans and large impairments of goodwill, especially in 
2013, are attributes of the rapid decline in results. In the stress test performed by 
EBA8 (2011) UniCredit had the second largest shortfall of € 8 billion in the 
Eurozone, after the Spanish bank Santander. The bank holds over € 40 billion of 
Italian government bonds with large liquidity problems, which reflected through the 
liquidity measures presented in this study. The LtA ratio is very high closing to 70% 
throughout the period, indicating a large share of the bank’s assets are tied into 
illiquid loans. The strong reliance on interbank lending and on ECB underlines the 
liquidity problem. The LAtD ratio is the lowest in comparison to the other banks, 
showing a low level of liquid assets in relation to customer deposits. To further 
improve its capital and liquidity position, UniCredit has taken several capital 
enhancement measures since 2009, amongst others through direct raise and 
retained earnings. The bank’s profitability has been declining since 2009. The ROA 
ratio has decreased from positive 0.3% in 2009 to -1.0% in 2011 and -1.7% in 2013. 
The decrease in lending to the private sector due to persistent weakness in demand 
for loans in the group’s key countries and the continued high levels of risk aversion 
is reflected on the bank’s balance sheet, where total assets have decreased in 2012 
and again in 2013. This, in combination with a constant decline in net profit, with 
exception of 2012, is the underlying factor to the noticeable decline in efficiency in 
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use of assets.  The ROE has followed the same pattern, going from just below 4% in 
2009 to around -30% in 2013, indicating far less profitability compared to its peers. 
The share value has lingered around 0% with spikes towards negative values mainly 
due to large write-downs and impairments.  
3.5.3 BNP Paribas 
BNP Paribas has its roots in France, where it is the largest publicly traded bank by 
assets since its merger with Banque Nationale de Paris in 2000, and is one of the 
largest banks in Europe. With its acquisition of the Italian bank BNL in 2006 and the 
Belgian Fortis in 2009, BNP Paribas has expanded its retail banking significantly. 
The financial crisis of 2008 timeline is often considered to have begun as BNP 
Paribas froze three of their funds in August of 2007, as they could no longer value 
the subprime collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) they owned. However, as the 
third largest bank in Europe, BNP Paribas is seen as one of the stronger European 
banks with a strong performance throughout the credit crisis. The bank has 
generated profits year after year since the crisis, with relatively limited write-downs 
of loans and limited exposure to the sub-prime backed debt.  It has had an overall 
asset base decrease of around 12% comparing 2013 numbers to 2009, with 
continuous high credit worthiness rating. In contrast to many of its peers, the bank 
has had a balanced business model with its core business being retail banking, 
representing two thirds of the bank’s activities. Investment banking activities have 
been limited and seen as add-on to its core business of retail. It’s traditional and 
conservative way of banking together with its prudent behaviour and sound 
business model have protected the bank from the struggles met by many of its 
peers. However, with a € 12 billion Italian sovereign debt and € 125 billion of other 
Italian credit exposure by end 2013, BNP Paribas has had some exposure to an 
Italian sovereign default. Write-downs on loans and securities from mainly Italy, 
together with the slow economic recovery of the bank’s largest market, France, as 
well the recent money-laundering charges, have hurt its performance to some 
extent. The ROA has been constant throughout the period, averaging around 0,3%. 
The ROE has been positive with limited volatility but with a slight declining trend, 
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going from 7.3% in 2009 to 5.3% by end of 2013. It has by far the best and most 
stable EPS results of the four banks in this study, with very limited changes, 
indicating strong performance. The bank has a high LtD ratio, just below 130% until 
2011, with a slight decrease in the following years ending at 120% in 2013 due to 
lower demand of loans. The ratio indicates limited liquidity and a lower level of 
contingency, making the bank vulnerable to any changes in the deposit market. 
However, this is representative of the bank’s risk-averse business model in 
traditional retail banking and regional focus, which supports its high loan-to-deposit 
ratio.  It is also of importance to evaluate the changes in loan to deposit ratio against 
the background of other changes in the bank’s composition of assets and liabilities. 
During 2011 and 2012, the banks started its adaptation of the new regulations, 
evident in their most liquid asset base, cash, almost doubling during this period, 
resulting in a high LAtD ratio indicating high liquidity in its purest form.  
3.5.4 Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
After several government bailouts, RBS still remains weak not only due the overall 
banking environment, but also to a large extent because of their activities prior to 
the crisis. RBS had an extremely aggressive strategy of expansion prior to the crisis, 
starting with a hostile takeover of NatWest in 2000, which came to be a success 
story for the bank at that point in time. This was shortly followed by further 
acquisitions of Royal Insurance, Churchill Insurance and Charter One amongst 
others. The continuous acquisitions and underperformance of the bank’s shares 
during this period with special regards to the acquisition of the Dutch bank ABN 
Amro in 2007, together with its exposure to the subprime market in US , its high 
exposure with regards to its leading position in retail and commercial banking in 
Northern Ireland and its excessive borrowing, had weakened the bank to an extent 
that it could not even slightly withstand the turbulence of the 2008 crisis, leading to 
the UK government taking a 58% stake in the bank as part of a capital raise scheme 
in 2008. In 2009 the second rescue plan was launched with the government 
increasing its stake to 81% by a further large capital injection. In 2009 RBS made 
record by unveiling the biggest losses in British corporate history, announcing a € 
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32 bn loss for 2008, mainly linked to large write-downs on the ABN Amro 
acquisition. Furthermore, RBS Group is one of the best examples of banks which 
operated with low levels of capital prior to the financial crisis of 2008, with a Core 
Tier 1 ratio of 4% at its worse. Throughout the period after the crisis, the bank has 
focused its attention to strengthening its capital position by both direct capital raise 
as well as de-risking of its portfolio by asset sales and large write-downs. Its Core 
Tier 1 Ratio has increased from 6.1% in 2009 to 10.9 % by 2013.   RBS has 
introduced comprehensive measures to get back on track in supporting the British 
Economy, rather than burdening it. To strengthen its balance sheet with increased 
focus on lending in UK, the bank has started to exit from the US market and is 
significantly shrinking its investment banking activities, concentrating more on 
making small-business-lending its core business. Alongside these developments, the 
bank has had a strong need to improve its ever dark performance, why efficiency 
and cost control are central areas in need of improvement. Looking at the 
performance results since 2009, the Group has made substantial losses, starting 
with a negative ROA of -0.1% in 2009 dropping to -1% by 2013. The ROE shows the 
same negative development in the performance with negative values for the entire 
period, ending at -15% in 2013. The Group’s returns are low compared to its costs of 
equity, also compared to comparable European peers. The bank is still suffering 
greatly from its recent history. In 2013, the bank’s pre-tax loss was € 9.9 bn 
compared to € 6.2 bn in the previous year, resulting in the sharp decline in ROA and 
ROE. Its cost to income ratio has increased gradually, ending at 64% in 2013, 
indicating decline in efficiency, with high operational spending generating low 
value.  RBS’s LtD ratio has gone from 154% at its worse in 2008 to 94% in 2013, 
with an objective to keep the ratio at 100%, delivering a stable risk profile and 
balance sheet. Liquidity ratio LAtD has improved but should be considered in the 
light of the 23% decrease of customer deposits during the five year period, 
simultaneous to liquid funds increasing. LtA ratio is kept around the 50%, however 
this is due to assets decreasing with the same rate and magnitude as loans during 
this period, reflecting a 40% decrease of both posts in 2013 compared to 2009. 
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4. Discussion 
The last couple of years have been a transition period for the banking industry. 
Operating challenges, slow economic growth, low interest environment in 
combination with higher litigation expenses and most of all tougher regulations, 
have been the main attributes of the banking industry post financial crisis of 2008. 
Commercial banking in Europe has gone through significant decline in credit 
volumes as a consequence to a lack of demand for credit, resulting in a decline of 
loan growth. Total investment banking volumes has continued to decline due to 
reduced profitable business segments as well as new stricter regulation. The recent 
regulatory requirements of Basel III are expected to re-shape the financial market 
landscape, however as history has shown, the success of the international Basel 
accords with regards to capital standards has been limited. Basel II was aimed to be 
the foundation of a sounder and safer banking industry, strengthening the 
international financial system, its stability and its ability to support sustainable 
economic growth. It brought a new dimension into the regulatory coverage of bank 
risk taking, where it moved beyond credit risk and attacked areas previously 
uncovered by its predecessor, such as market risk and operational risk. However it 
is evident that the accord has failed to achieve its main objectives in regards to 
financial stability. In a simplistic way Basel III can be described as “more of the 
same- but better”. More liquidity is required for more resilience, more extensive risk 
management for robustness, and more supervision to ensure further transparency. 
One thing is for sure, the new regulation will hit banks hard. The stricter definition 
of capital and capital quality, together with an increase of RWA for trading book 
positions and direct counterparty risk exposure, decrease the capital ratios of banks 
significantly. In addition to this, banks are required to increase their capital ratios 
by 2019 and they are forced to reconsider their liquidity position as well as their 
sources of funding. Even though new regulations are indeed necessary, the question 
is whether Basel III is the answer and will it be sufficient to ensure future financial 
stability. There are several reasons why an increase of capital ratio might not be 
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successful at limiting excessive risk taking on its own. As a higher capital ratio goes 
hand in hand with higher cost of capital, which means that in order to generate 
higher return in an attempt to offset the increased cost, banks can come to carry 
more risk. If access to capital markets is too expensive, which is plausible in short- 
to mid-term, banks will be incentivized to generate capital by riskier activities. 
Higher cost of capital and higher compliance cost will increase the price of debt, 
consequently resulting in decreased lending.  
As the theoretical framework suggest, charter value erosion goes hand in hand with 
reduced profitability of banks. Due to higher capital requirements, higher costs and 
lower margins in capital and investment banking as well as retail banking, 
profitability performance is reduced for all four banks in this study. The extent, to 
which profitability is hurt due to tougher regulations, varies between the banks, 
mainly dependent on their starting position in terms of business models, exposure 
of risk in their portfolios, together with the economic environment in their 
countries. UniCredit for example has had one of the weakest starting points going 
into the crisis, with significant sovereign debt exposure and low liquidity. BNP 
Paribas has also had sovereign debt exposure and has also suffered from deposit 
drains in France; however the bank has had an overall strong position in retail 
banking, with continuous growth in the segment throughout the crisis period by 
acquiring Fortis in 2009. Deutsche Bank has had great benefits of the strong German 
economy and a stable government with high accessibility to capital markets, in 
combination with a sound business model. RBS on the other hand, with its 
aggressive expansion strategy and the long list of acquisitions between 2000-2007 
of which many made no economic sense, together with its exposure to Northern 
Ireland and to subprime debt in the US, went into the crisis with no leg to stand on. 
Going forward, even in state of recovery of the financial environment, RBS Group is 
faced with considerable operational and financial challenges in the road of 
becoming ready for re-privatization. Six years after the crisis, and RBS is still 
struggling. High political pressure, weak performance, lack of capital and an 
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investment banking division which today contributes to approximately 10% of the 
group profits compared to 60%  back in 2009, all indicating a long road to recovery.  
Another key determinant of charter value (and profitability) discussed in this study 
is competition, why the competitive environment and entry costs to the market are 
fundamental in building profitability and charter value. As theory suggests, in a 
situation of perfect competition, profits go to zero. Regulation reduces competition 
by erecting barriers to entry, boosting profitability for the firms that are able to 
meet the regulatory requirements. Several national and international developments 
during the 1970s created features of instability in the financial sector, generating a 
challenging economic environment which put the banking industry to test. More 
volatility was introduced in the currency market as the exchange rates of some of 
the world’s major currencies were allowed to float. Oil price changes with roots in 
political embargoes had a significant effect on the price levels, variations in interest 
rates were experienced due to inflation and monetary policy actions. The banking 
sector itself was dramatically changed due to increased competition as entry 
restrictions were lifted and regulatory restrictions were loosened, resulting in not 
only more players but also an expansion of the banking activities. The technological 
revolution in itself meant innovations in financial products, leading to profits being 
generated through new channels. Despite new sources of business and the gained 
efficiency due to technological development, the increased market volatility and 
competition led to marginalized profits and thereby increased bank risk-taking in 
order to boost profits, evident in banks’ loan portfolios growing. This is a 
development which has been repeated during the period prior to the latest financial 
crisis.  The real long term implications of Basel III on competition of banks, defined 
as the number of banks operating, are yet to be seen. However, tougher regulations 
will have implications for competitive landscape between banks of different sizes. 
As theory suggests, regulation has a negative effect on competition, leading to more 
consolidation of banks, with large banks absorbing smaller banks who cannot keep 
up profitability due to the regulations imposed on them. In the light of CVH, this will 
have a positive effect on charter value build up by the banks remaining active on the 
  
 
39 
 
market. Furthermore, the jurisdictional differences in implementation of the accord 
are of great concern. As Basel III is not of legal force, but rather a set of standards 
with the expectation of members to adapt and implement the requirements, there 
are inconsistencies to be expected. These inconsistencies between different 
jurisdictions, specifically on calculating risk-weighted assets, have already been 
observed by assessments conducted by the committee itself. This could have an 
impact on competition among internationally active banks. In addition, differences 
in tax legislations, access to capital, cost of capital as well as accounting rules will 
contribute to this effect. With regards to decrease in competition due to tougher 
regulations, and charter value build up, it is of relevance to consider the U-shaped 
relationship between the two. Too high levels of pressure put on the market with 
competition being strangled; leading to too high concentration will have negative 
effect on charter value and could contribute to the “too-big-too-fail” problem.  
The most dangerous aspect of Basel III and the factor which can contribute to the 
accord failing its objectives is its ignorance in addressing the main reason why Basel 
II failed, namely the definition of risk and calculation of risk weights. Capital 
requirement in itself is not where the problem lies. Keeping capital against riskier 
assets was one of the main components of Basel II, and still this didn’t hinder 
instability within the financial system. The risk associated with the assets held by 
banks and financial institutions were calculated based on ratings assigned by the 
rating agencies, which meant high rating was considered to be equal to low risk. One 
thing that the recent financial crisis has come to show is that ratings are not an 
adequate indicator of risk in a complex financial system. This is why it is of 
importance to recognize that the factors that brought banks such as Bank of 
America and Citigroup to their knees, were not primarily first hand exposure to the 
sub-prime loans, it was the risk they (and many other banks) were exposed to 
through debt which were backed by these loans.  The banking environment has its 
roots in the interconnectedness of financial arrangements, both between banks 
themselves, as well as with derivative counterparties, having a direct effect on 
consumption and investment decisions. This is why any disruption within the sector 
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has significant effects on the economy. As the financial crisis of 2008 was evolving, 
the full spectrum of the problem was not recognized in the early stages. The direct 
response from governments, in US and as well as in Europe, was firstly to tackle the 
liquidity problems that could occur in a case of a run. This was ensured through 
central banks pumping liquidity into the system by holding worthless assets 
accumulated by banks against providing credit at reduced interest rates.  Secondly, 
the focus was on banks cleaning up their balance sheets by getting rid of the toxic 
assets in their portfolios. This resulted in banks writing down assets, and further 
governments making significant capital reinjections in order to save the banks from 
bankruptcy. The problem of capturing actual risk in a banking system that has 
moved away from the “buy-and-hold” way of banking, where credit assets were hold 
to the point of maturity, to a “originate-and-sell” way of banking, where credit risk is 
transferred through securitization, is central in a discussion of regulation. Assets 
with high credit risks being packaged into products and sold on meant an automatic 
discount of the risk for the receiver of the products, leading to a skewed assessment 
of actual risk. The existence of CDS contracts and tax arbitrage make the capital 
requirement rules insufficient as the contracts provide an opportunity to reduce (o 
rather discount) risk by moving the risk outside of the bank sector. Shadowing bank 
systems, such as insurance companies, hedge funds etc. are not regulated to the 
same extent as banks are, which results in banks transferring risk and expanding 
leverage in a manner that counteracts the intent of Basel risk-weighting approach.  
Furthermore, the approach encourages portfolio concentrations in assets such as 
government bonds, mortgages and lending between banks, all identified as low risk 
and therefore low weighted. As we now know, this has been one of the biggest 
issues during the financial crisis. In the four banks analyzed in this study, sovereign 
debt exposure has been central to how bad the banks have been hit throughout the 
crisis. UniCredit for example have had a very high exposure to Italian debt, reflecting 
the low asset quality, high capital shortfall and poor performance throughout the 
crisis. The Basel accord does not take into account that in some jurisdictions 
sovereign bonds are not risk-free or low-risk and could even carry great exposure to 
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default risk. This is a concerning aspect of the one-size-fits-all approach and reflects 
the existing limitations in integration between regulation and supervision.   
Pro-cyclicality of the Basel system has been ignored previously. This has been a 
problem as capital and leverage ratios are dependent on current market values and 
risk measurements being point-in-time, leading to underestimation of risk in good 
times and overestimation of risk in bad times. The same applies to counterparty 
credit assessment, and external credit ratings, which are widely used by banks in 
evaluating risk. This is an area that has been addressed by the new accord, requiring 
banks to assess both counterparty risks as well as off balance sheet risks and to hold 
more capital against these. However, measuring risk by the IRB approach and by 
putting banks themselves in charge of the assessment, one must account for the 
subjectiveness of the process. Inputs for modeling risk can be manipulated to reduce 
regulatory capital required.  
Further, the assumption of the negative relationship between higher equity and risk 
is given under restrictive and monotone assumptions, not capturing the adaptive 
system which financial markets are characterized by. In general, firms tend to not 
hold too large amounts of equity relative to debt, as it is too expensive and it gives 
incentives to take higher risks to be able to satisfy required returns by the 
shareholders. The higher cost associated with holding too large portions of equity, 
can also be passed on to customers through higher interest rates and thereby less 
lending.  As it is seen in the previous section, all four banks experience increased 
pressure on their return on equity due to increase capital and liquidity costs, as 
expected. It is therefore vital to monitor long term risk behavior as high returns will 
be expected in line with recovery and economic growth.  
Where Charter value hypothesis can come to play a central role, is in preservation of 
high capital ratios. As stated by the theory, banks with high charter value tend to 
keep more capital relative to assets, and maintain more prudent risk strategies and 
more diversified loan portfolios. It is one thing to introduce new regulations for 
capital and liquidity requirements, and another to ensure that banks keep higher 
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capital ratios and quality capital in the long run. This can only be done by keeping 
profitability steady, as too low performance and erosion of charter value will 
incentivize banks to take on more risk to generate profits. As discussed in previous 
sections, an underlying source of charter value and is the level of competition. 
Lowered market power and squeezed profits in a highly competitive market erode 
charter and lead to activities being directed towards high risk- high reward rather 
than maintenance of capital adequacy. Given Basel III’s imperfections, especially 
with regards to risk-weighting and the banking system’s nature, where risks are 
non-transparent and easily disguised and transferred, as well as the complexity of 
the system, monitoring such activities will be difficult. Different implementations of 
the accord will only add to this problem. However assuming implementation of 
Basel III will lower competition to some extent, which is very plausible; it will result 
in increased market power, build-up of charter value, and thereby lower risk of 
default- justifying the trade-off between competition and financial stability as 
assessed in the theoretical framework. Also, assuming that the effect on competition 
is not too extreme, i.e. the competitive environment is not completely strangled, 
which is equally plausible as the last statement, there should not be value loss due 
to lowered efficiency levels on the market.   
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5. Conclusion 
Banks play a central role in the economy as they are the main source of liquidity in 
the financial system and therefore a necessity organ for commerce. This position 
alone, creates a need to ensure that they withstand downturns in the economy by 
having sufficient capital to cover unexpected losses and thereby insolvency. But 
further, a learned lesson from the recent financial crisis is that even though lack of 
liquidity and solvency were two central areas of concern as bad times became 
reality, the actual root of the problem lies with the risk behaviors of banks over the 
last decades. Furthermore, regulations failed to ensure financial stability and act as 
prevention to excessive risk taking and unsound short sighted way of banking. This 
has led to attention being directed towards regulators and existing regulations and 
their shortcomings. In this paper, the question at hand was to examine what 
changes are to be expected in the banking industry given an implementation of the 
new Basel III regulations, and how these can be explained by the charter value 
hypothesis. On the basis of theoretical framework around charter value and its key 
determinants, Basel III implications on banking industry have been examined. As 
the adaption of the new regulatory requirements have already started, focus of the 
empirical work was placed on four of the largest European banks and their finances, 
aiming to capture how performance and  strategic way forward have been impacted 
since. It is fair to conclude that adaptation of the new requirements have 
implications of different magnitudes, depending on how badly the banks were hit 
during the crisis. Their business models, risk behaviors and activities prior to the 
crisis of 2008, have not only been dominant factors for their survival abilities during 
the crisis, but are also crucial for their path to recovery and ability to adapt to the 
new environment of tougher regulations. From the four banks studied, it is evident 
that performance is pressured as the new regulations demand better asset quality, 
higher liquidity and reduced exposure to complex structured assets. Further, retail 
and private banking are becoming more and more attractive for European banks, 
evident for the banks studied in this paper. The new regulations have led to 
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shrinkage of investment banking activities and financial market trading, as well as 
to a weaker international presence of European banks as many are focusing their 
attention to domestic markets. As more stable revenue generation is promoted, 
banks with concentrated activities in retail and private banking, as shown for BNP 
Paribas here, are less impacted compared to banks with large investment banking 
activities. As a result of tougher regulations on the market, competition is expected 
to decline and concentration to grow.  In the long run, this effect might be a 
necessity for regulation to be effective. On one hand, as we have seen in this study, 
returns and profitability will be affected negatively by adaptation of Basel III.  On 
the other hand, regulated markets will lead to higher margins due to entry barriers 
and concentration, automatically boosting profitability and creation of charter 
value.  This effect will be a necessity for prudent behavior, as cost of risk will 
increase and banks will seek to preserve value as well as comply with regulation by 
limiting excessive risk taking. This means that the co-existence of strict regulations 
and low profit margins due to high competitiveness on the market could sooner or 
later lead to banks being incentivized to take on more risk in order to both provide 
high returns as well as to comply with regulations. This is central in the light of 
regulation leading to financial stability rather than to an appetite for risk due to 
constrained profitability. To conclude, Basel III will set a new scene for banking, and 
it will create the premises for solvency and liquidity when we get into difficult 
economic times. Its biggest weakness lie in its limited strength in preventing the 
actual rise of financial crisis originated from banking. This problem goes beyond 
having enough capital and high liquidity to endure economic shocks. It involves 
creating and promoting in-built mechanisms for preservation of value and efficient 
risk management in the pursuit of long term financial stability.  
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